label "organizational migrants" by leading scholars, in the mainstream migration historiography attention to their mobility is conspicuously lacking.
Given the conventional-and often political and policy-drivendefinitions of what constitutes a migrant, this need not come as a surprise. Most people still conceive of migrants as people who decide to move to a faraway country with the aim to stay there for the rest of their lives, learn the language, join the new community, and assimilate, or, depending on the prevailing membership regime and preferences of the migrants themselves, establish long-term recognizable ethnic communities. 4 Over the last half century this stereotypical "one-way-moveand-settle" image has been revised thoroughly by migration scholars, and the "toolbox" now also consists of concepts such as return migration, sojourning, transnationalism, diaspora, and the like. 5 This broadening of the perspective, however, has only very partially reached as far as the people we call organizational migrants, such as soldiers, corporate expatriates, diplomats, missionaries, scholars and aid workers.
This persistent exclusion seems to result from the following mix of assumptions about organizational migrants:
5. Finally, they do not fit the "subaltern, 8 marginal man" or peasant image that has remained so dominant in most migration studies since the late nineteenth century.
The fundamental critique of the original Chicago school's interpretation of human mobility since the 1960s has not altered this image. In a way, the critique unintentionally has further aggravated the isolation of organizational migrants, due to the stress on the importance of individual agency and personal networks. 9 The advantage is that we no longer conceive of migrants as passive particles pushed and pulled around, but rather acknowledge their agency. Furthermore, the botanical metaphor of uprootedness has been replaced by that of transplantation. 10 These necessary spotlights on the importance of personal ("strong") ties and agency, however, did not lead to a fundamental paradigm shift pertaining to organizational migrants, since lower-class labor migrants remained the prime object of study.
To understand the blind spot for organizational migrants, the association with "invaders" (as the antithesis of the vulnerable migrant) is probably crucial, because most of the other four characteristics listed above also largely apply to other multiyear labor migrants, such as Mediterranean "guest workers" or Mexican "braceros" in the twentieth century.
11 What distinguishes these labor migrants from organizational migrants is their low socioeconomic status. And this is where ideology weighs heavily.
Migration history as a distinct field of scholarship emerged in the 1960s and 1970s as part of the "new social history" that demanded that the "people without history," both in Europe and in other parts of the world, would get their fair share of attention and rehabilitation. 12 Workers, women, minorities, people in the (former) colonies, homosexuals, anarchists, and migrants all had in common that they had been marginalized, repressed, and exploited by capitalist, militarist, and patriarchal regimes, and historians and scholars from various disciplines (history, anthropology, sociology) became very interested in their voices and emancipation struggles, often with a Foucauldian gaze. 13 Hence, social history, initially negatively defined as "history with the politics left out,"
14 became a stronghold of the downtrodden and "subaltern," and developed a series of subspecialties, such as labor history, gender history, ethnic history, urban history, and last but not least migration history. From this perspective, organizational migrants, although also mostly consisting of ordinary men (soldiers) and sometimes women (such as schoolteachers), and often peasants themselves, were often seen as reactionary instruments in the hands of capitalist, imperialist, and repressive elites, and as such fit uncomfortably into the new social history wave. 15 This is even more true for highly skilled "organizational migrants," who were primarily seen as members of the elite, such as corporate expatriates, missionaries, scholars, and diplomats. 16 From the 1990s onward a number of social historians have acknowledged that organizational migrants should be studied within labor or colonial history, but this has not made a major impact in mainstream studies. See, for example, A. Lüdtke, "Alltagsgeschichte: Aneignung und Akteure: Oder, es hat noch kaum begonnen!" WerkstattGeschichte 17 (1997): 83-92; A. Lüdtke, "Arbeiten und Kriegsführen: Soldatsein als (Kriegsarbeit)," Praxis Geschichte 12, no. 2 (1999): 32-35; J. Lucassen, and E.-J. Zürcher, "Conscription as Although labor history remained heavily focused on proletarian wage workers, 17 since the 1990s the influence of the new social history on the field of migration has broadened its horizon somewhat. Gradually the role of the state and other institutions has been recognized, reluctantly bringing slaves as well as merchants, artists, and migratory scholars into the picture. 18 This was further stimulated by the emergence of global or world history as a field, in which itinerants were increasingly seen as crucial agents in the forging of global connections and empire. The growing interest in transnationalism and supranational organizations especially, 19 helped to make the migratory behavior of its actors more visible. With Patrick Manning's typology of cross-cultural migration, organizational migrants (although not labeled as such) finally took center stage. 21 His fourfold distinction included "invaders," "sojourners," and "itinerants" alongside the more conventional "settlers."
In this article, we build on the conceptual contributions by Tilly and Manning and propose to take their typological contributions one step further. We combine the category of "career migrants" (Tilly) with those of "invaders," "sojourners," and "itinerants" (Manning) , thereby merging elements of these four concepts into the concept of "organizational migrants." We define them as people (and their dependents) whose migratory behavior is primarily determined by the interests of the organization they have joined (voluntarily or forced). Moreover, we make a strong plea to include them systematically in the field of migration (and labor) studies, from both a historical and a social science perspective. As there are many different kinds of organizations that employ people and send them to different destinations in order to fight, negotiate, work, or help others, we decided to focus on two key institutions: (1) the army and (2) NGOs and their precursors (religious and humanitarian organizations).
The reason for this choice is, first of all, that it offers us a chance to compare a state institution with a nonstate (civil society) one, but also because it enables us to compare on average elite migrants (missionaries and aid workers) with predominantly low-status migrants (soldiers) over a long period of time. Notwithstanding this wide spectrum, we will demonstrate a number of important commonalities shared by organizational migrants, irrespective of class background and time period, as well as some differences. Moreover, by including original quantitative data (in the case of soldiers) and qualitative examples (in the case of aid workers), we will illustrate their behavior as migrants. Finally, our specific comparative design follows Nancy Green's call not to concentrate on specific ethnic groups, but rather to take certain economic sectors or institutions as the unit of analysis. 
Soldiers as Migrants
As the historian Joshua Sanborn remarked in an article on the experiences of Russian soldiers during and immediately after World War I, migration history, like labor history, has treated soldiers badly. 23 Their on-average-low-class-status notwithstanding, soldiers may be termed the ultimate outcasts given their role in organized violence, aggression, and repression. But even this perspective on soldiers as instruments of the powerful is problematic. Encounters between soldiers and civilians do indeed often result in repression (of social movements), 24 mass violence, rape, destruction, and religious and ethnic cleansing, but not always and not necessarily. Marjoleine Kars, for example, shows how European mercenaries in the Dutch colony of Berbice (part of Dutch Guiana) in the early 1760s, instead of fighting, joined runaway slaves, thus turning into subalterns themselves. 25 But even when soldiers just did their job, cross-cultural contacts were quite common. Although Kars does not make a link to migration history, she pleads for a much broader perspective on the social and cultural role of soldiers:
Colonial historians have usually studied professional soldiers in their capacity of border enforcers, men sent overseas to maintain the cultural and legal divisions upon which colonial authority rested. Yet, in fact, soldiers regularly became key figures of connection as they straddled and crossed the very boundaries (literal and metaphorical) the authorities intended for them to maintain. Generally stationed on contested middle ground on the edges of empire, soldiers forged individual connections with indigenous peoples and slaves. Some of these contacts were considered routine and were accepted by the authorities. Others, however, struck hard at the very foundations of colonialism, challenging and violating European ideological premises with potentially explosive results. The mutiny in Berbice, carried out in the midst of a huge slave rebellion, represents one such threat.
26
Her analysis fits quite well with the important observation by Joshua Sanborn, who argues that-almost by definition-in studies from below, analytical definitions tend to be determined by subjective views of those under study:
[H]istorians of migration have been even less receptive to the notion that soldiers can be analyzed as migrants than historians of armies have been to the idea that soldiers can be analyzed as murderers. For both sets of historians, the subjective context of social acts is the key. If soldiers believe they are not migrants because they think their social lives are suspended by war and because they plan to return home, then they are not migrants. If they believe that they are killing for the cause and if they know they are legally committed to killing rather than legally prohibited from doing so, then they are not murderers.
27
As often with narrow definitions, we rob ourselves of comparative benefits that, as Sanborn and others have shown, are considerable in the case of soldiers and other organizational migrants. 28 When we do not let ideology obstruct our view and focus on the spatial and social behavior of soldiers, while adopting the more social geographical perspective of scholars such as Wilbur Zelinsky, 29 then this category turns out to be highly relevant for our understanding of human migrations and labor relations. And we do not mean this primarily in their func- 26 30 As the world wars in the twentieth century "started with trains and not with trenches," we should first consider the phase of mobilization. This lifts (mostly, but not exclusively) 31 men from their ordinary social context (family, village, urban neighborhood, workplace, gendered social networks) and puts them in a very different social context, becoming members of a new social formation of only men, often from very different parts of the country or empire, with different class, language, religious, and ethnic backgrounds, and with new and singular social rules, identities, and solidarities. In the barracks and at the front, they share this both exciting and frightening experience with their loved ones back home through letters and other means of communication, just like other migrants. 32 The second context that makes them migrants is their contacts with civilians or enemy soldiers. These can be both peaceful and violent, but as the scholarship on military history shows, they are often much more intense and mutually dependent than most people realize-and much more than the army leadership would like. This was even the case, for example, in the trench warfare on the Western Front during World War I. 33 As the experience of more recent wars (Korea, Vietnam, RussoAfghan, American-Afghan, and Iraq) illustrates, quite often those soldiers lucky enough to return alive have changed considerably, physically and mentally, and go through another process of desocialization and resocialization. Their experiences as soldiers can have both psy- 30 This tripartite distinction works less well in the early modern period. There the migration patterns of soldiers, particularly mercenaries (and sailors), were often multiphased, shifting in and out of service as well as shifting among cultural groups and settings. 31 In the course of the twentieth century, women also entered the army, whereas in the early modern period many women accompanied male soldiers as camp followers. 32 With the difference that the army, from the twentieth century onward, started censoring such letters, because such interchanges might lower morale or disclose strategic information. 33 Sanborn, "Unsettling the Empire," 291.
chological (including post-stress syndrome) and social dimensions, but what they have in common with other migrants is that upon returning, they look with very different eyes on the familiar but also narrow world that once encapsulated them. 34 Moreover, the positions of "tied migrants" or "military dependents" (partners, children) have changed as well. 35 Finally, there are ample studies-especially those on empires-that show that not only are soldiers instrumental in extending the empire by moving the frontiers, but that many of them subsequently settle as farmers, often in very different ecological zones. These colonizations have a huge impact on the migrants themselves, who (as in the case of China, Japan, Russia, and the Ottoman empire) often have traveled over very long distances, but also on the native populations in these areas, for better or for worse.
36

Historiography
Although, for the reasons sketched above, soldiers have not often been studied as labor migrants, their mobility has been widely mapped and studied by military historians, whose work is just waiting to be mined. 37 Military historians, like their maritime colleagues (when it comes to the migratory experience of sailors), have been crucial in providing a wealth of data on labor migration. However, in contrast to "labor," 34 G. Rosen, "Nostalgia: A 'Forgotten' Psychological Disorder," Psychological Medicine 5, no. 4 (1975) they seldom use "migration" as an organizing and sensitizing concept. And even when they do so, these studies have trouble becoming incorporated into mainstream migration history, thus leaving the splendid isolation of the two fields intact.
In the last decade this has slowly begun to change for the better. In 2008, Jochen Oltmer published a useful migration typology that included soldiers. 38 At first sight, Oltmer's approach does not seem to be relevant, as he primarily focuses on forced migrations, and thus on people who are forced to flee because of warfare. He does not, however, leave it at that but treats soldiers both as forces that "move" others and as employees who are moved due to the orders they receive. He therefore includes soldiers as forced migrants within the context of military labor markets. This labor dimension of temporary, multiannual migrants has proven very fruitful to bridge the gap between military and migration history. A similar approach can be found in the crosscultural migration typology of Jan and Leo Lucassen, in which soldiers and sailors are systematically studied as exponents of "temporal multiannual migrations."
39 An important step forward is the previously mentioned approach that Siegelbaum and Moch take to the migratory process of soldiers. Using the case of Russia in the twentieth century, they analytically distinguish three phases: (1) mobilization/leaving home, (2) active service, and (3) demobilization/return. Stimulated by the work of Sanborn, for each phase they convincingly show the similarities with other migrants from a (de/re)socialization perspective. 40 In the burgeoning historiography, the stress is clearly on the first two phases. Most studies deal with recruitment, size, numbers, wages, labor relations, spatial deployment, composition, mortality, and productivity. However, housing, billeting of troops, local contacts, and sociocultural interactions are also excellent units of analysis that bring soldiers into migration studies. In recent decades these topics have been studied intensely, making it possible to quantify soldiers as migrants both in Europe and in Asia in the last half millennium. 41 As William Tatum describes in his analysis of eighteenth-century British army studies, we still witness the aftermath of the incorporation of new social history agendas and analytical tools into the "new military history" from the 1970s onward. Although this has resulted in more attention paid to the social history of armies and the impact of war on society-be it at home or abroad-Tatum is critical of the way it overemphasizes the lack of agency at the lower levels of the institution. Instead, he suggests that a division between history of war and history of the army (leaving the combat out) will open the field to historians from other subfields.
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These recent initiatives link up quite well with the more international and comparative-oriented projects. A showcase is the dossier in the International Review of Social History (1998) 43 and the long-term research project "Fighting For a Living." 44 Like the volume on migration and the military by Matthias Asche and others from 2008, as well as a recent overview of transnational soldiers, 45 these programmatic studies explicitly connect war, military labor markets, and migration for the early modern and modern periods, 46 and make clear that soldiersboth footmen and officers-were labor migrants for whom the military was a way to earn a living, one that involved moving around, often over considerable distances. The often impressive spatial mobility was reduced somewhat with the rise of standing armies and conscription in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but in the latter case, as soon as wars broke out, massive armies often crossed international or internal imperial borders and were exposed not only to bullets and bombs, but also to other cultures. 47 In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, soldiers were also central to the imperial project, as Ulbe Bosma has argued convincingly. 48 He calculated that in the course of the nineteenth century, at least 6.5 million European soldiers left for the colonies, predominantly in Asia (especially in British India and the Dutch East Indies). He also shows that there are ample reasons to consider them both as migrants and settlers, because many of them settled for good as "white labor" in the colonies. One of the reasons they have been ignored for so long, according to Bosma, is that in the era heralded as the breakthrough of "free migration" (1850-1940), soldiers were still predominantly perceived as people who were more or less forced and pressed into service, or at least as migrants without the freedom to choose their destination. The increase in the number of European soldiers sent to other continents, therefore, coincided with the rise of the idea that coerced (indentured) migration was typical for non-Western "races," especially Chinese and Indians. 49 Another reason these huge numbers of soldiermigrants have been left out of the migration story is that they were assumed to be isolated from the local population and their stay temporary. Bosma's work shows otherwise, and his analysis fits within a wider stream of literature by military historians working on Europe. Especially in the case of mercenaries, garrisons, and long-term occupation armies, soldiers fought very little and had plenty of time to interact with the local population in a more peaceful way. The billeting of foreign (mercenary) soldiers, especially Swiss and Scottish, was quite normal in early modern cities and created numerous contact zones in which cross-cultural exchanges took place. 50 In 1701, some fifty-four thousand Scottish soldiers were serving in France, the Dutch Republic, Spain, and other European states, whereas during the entire eighteenth century, more than three hundred thousand Swiss mercenaries worked 47 Although we refer to soldiers as men, we are aware of the practice of women disguising themselves as men to join the army. According to F. Easton, female soldiering was well tolerated and rewarded in the early modern plebeian world of work. abroad. 51 Moreover, many mercenaries did not return after they retired but instead stayed on, often marrying local women. Thousands of Scots were thus integrated into local German, Swedish, Dutch, and Russian societies, while partly maintaining their own brand of faith in the Scottish Kirk. 52 Another case study shows how soldiers in eighteenthcentury Göttingen who wanted to integrate into local society had a clear advantage over other migrants, thanks to the contacts and social networks they had built during their stay in the barracks. 53 With the emergence of draft armies and modern warfare, one might expect that contacts between soldiers and civilians would be greatly diminished. As recent studies on World Wars I and II, as well as on postwar occupation armies, have shown, however, this is not the case. 54 The pioneering work of Maria Höhn and others has shown that the impact of the many American bases in postwar Germany, for example, was much greater than is often assumed. At the local level, Americans frequently interacted with German women and men in bars, cafés, and shops, but also in towns and villages where many soldiers rented housing, which led to thousands of marriages and mixed offspring. Furthermore, at the collective level the American presence, as symbol of modernity (including looser sexual norms) and the new consumption culture (Hollywood movies, popular music), deeply influenced German society. It is therefore understandable that conservative circles in Germany were profoundly worried about what they perceived as an attack on traditional religious and social norms and values. 55 One could, of course, argue that the cultural revolution of the 1960s and 1970s would have made its influence felt anyway, but it is an undisputed fact that the interpersonal contacts with American soldiers, black and white, socialized hundreds of thousands of Germans in a much more direct and intensive way-contacts that, moreover, led to the emigration of many thousands of German women who married American GIs and often accompanied their husbands when their tours of duty came to an end. As Goodman describes in her article "Only the Best British Brides," in the case of U. this resulted in the engagement of government agencies, army generals, and the Women Volunteers Service in making sure these interactions would be with the "good-type" (that is, social class) girl.
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This brings us to the third phase distinguished by Siegelbaum and Moch in their book: demobilization and returning home. One of the most glaring examples is the social and political effect that returning African American soldiers had on American society, 57 having encountered for the first time in their lives a non-racially segregated society. Although racism was not absent from German communities surrounding American bases, it was largely imported by the American army itself, which upheld discriminatory measures within its ranks well into the 1960s.
58 Notwithstanding the occurrence of discrimination against black GIs by Germans (landlords, bar owners, and so on), their German tour of duty made them realize that being treated as second-rate citizens, or worse, was not normal. Or, in the prophetic words of the distinguished African American writer William Gardner Smith in 1947: After being treated as social equals, Black American GIs would "never go back to the old way again."
59 And this holds true not only for those who had liberated Europe from Nazi rule, but also for the millions of African-American soldiers who were based in Germany in the decades to follow. The impact of the German experience of returning black soldiers on the slowly unfolding civil rights movement in the U.S. was also recognized and discussed at the time, as has been demonstrated by an analysis of the influential black weekly Ebony and similar periodicals and newspaper in the postwar period. 60 In in Goodman's study, there was also a fear of mixed-race relationships and "black babies."
61 Similar issues came into question with respect to the "war brides" of American soldiers returning from countries such as Japan and Korea, who fell under the Chinese Exclusion Acts. Wolgin and Bloemraad suggest that the reforms necessary for the return of these soldiers with their families caused a shift from race-based to family-reunification policies in the U.S. since 1965.
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Mainstreaming
As always, it takes time before specialist studies influence mainstream narratives and conceptualizations. To illustrate this we looked at four major reference works in the field of migration studies: three migration encyclopedias from the period 1995-2013 and Dirk Hoerder's encompassing monograph from 2002.
Although attention to soldiers in these three works of course depends on the (often implicit) definitions and concerns of the editors, they reflect trends in the broader historiography. The good news is that interest in soldiers as migrants is clearly on the rise, with the most recent Cambridge encyclopedia as a provisional culmination point. This is not so much reflected by the number of pages discussing soldiers as (labor) migrants, but by the broadening range of historical experiences. This becomes clear when we compare Dirk Hoerder's magnum opus with the collective encyclopedia by Klaus Bade et al. Hoerder discusses soldiers largely in relation to the Middle Ages and the early modern period (starting with the Crusades), and limits the study of soldiers in the modern period to colonial contexts. 63 Hoerder does touch upon soldiers in the twentieth century, 64 but less systematically and with a predilection for prisoners of war and demobilized soldiers. Surprisingly, given his focus on intercultural contacts, he barely discusses the contact zones between soldiers and civilians. This aspect is explored in greater depth in the 2011 Cambridge encyclopedia by Bade et al., espe-61 This racial fear was also used for anti-U.S. communist propaganda. Goodman stresses that the fact that these soldiers served during peacetime made them more vulnerable to negative (political) stereotypes, whereas they were not solely "sacrificing." Goodman, "'Only the Best British Brides,'" 499-500.
62 Wolgin and Bloemraad, "'Our Gratitude to Our Soldiers,'" 28-30. 63 Hoerder, Cultures in Contact, 278-279, and for Russia also later (316). On the colonial context, see 423-425. 64 Ibid., 450-453.
cially in entries that deal with war brides 65 and the military occupation of postwar East and West Germany by Christian Müller, who gives an excellent overview of the manifold contacts between American and Russian soldiers and German citizens in the postwar period. Based on his own work as well as that of Maria Höhn and others, he shows that the idea of isolation should be rejected. 66 The most recent encyclope- 68 One of the distinct forms of cross-cultural migration is people who move as "invaders" and not so much join as take over new societies, imposing their rule and thus forging social change. Although we largely agree with this position, we also would like to test these assumptions and thus "unpack" the invader category more thoroughly. Let us first focus on the numerical importance of soldiers as migrants compared to other cross-cultural forms of migration. How many people have been active as soldiers, and-in earlier times-as people who moved with soldiers-wives, children, prostitutes, peddlers, and musicians? In military history these groups are known as "the army train," so vividly portrayed by Bertolt Brecht in his famous antimilitarist play "Mutter Courage und ihre Kinder" (1939), situated in Germany's Thirty Years' War. 69 To make the numerical importance of soldiers as cross-cultural migrants visible, restricting ourselves to those soldiers who were active in other countries in Europe's past five centuries, we used a typology developed in 2009 to define and measure cross-cultural migrations worldwide, with the aim to measure how many individuals in a certain geographical space (a region, a country, a continent) experienced at least one crosscultural move in their life. 70 The method first requires that research- ers define the geographical and temporal unit of analysis, in this case Europe from 1500 to 2000, and measure those who:
Soldiers and sailors have been subsumed in the last category and, in order to avoid double counts, have been left out of the immigration and emigration categories. Figure 1 shows the importance of "temporal multi-annual" migrations in Europe since 1500, the bulk of which regards soldiers. In most periods, soldiers constitute over half the total number of cross-cultural migrants in Europe, with their share reaching an all-time high in absolute and relative numbers in the first half of . Note: For the twentieth century we did leave out people who moved to cities within European nation-states, because by that time most nation-states had become culturally so homogenous that the internal move from village to city did not imply a fundamental cultural change. the twentieth century due to the two World Wars. But numbers also remain high in the latter part of the twentieth century, notwithstanding the absence of war (except in Yugoslavia in the 1990s), because of the already mentioned contingents of American and Russian troops. 71 In Tables 2 and 3 we have summarized the main wars and occupations in which European soldiers and soldiers from other continents active in Europe were involved in the twentieth century. Apart from the fact that these 125 million soldiers (mainly men, but also women and families, especially in the case of post-World War II military bases) moved over long distances, many of them also engaged in all kinds of contact with locals that influenced their cultural knowledge and sometimes worldviews, which many of them also infused into their home communities.
What makes soldiers stand out as organizational migrants is that their agency as migrants and workers is quite limited due to the strict discipline, nonnegotiable chain of command, and severe sanctions on breaching the rules of the military (with the death penalty for desertion as the most extreme example). In this sense their position bears some resemblance to that of indentured workers and slaves in terms of the coercive elements of labor relations. Additionally, most of the soldiers were low skilled and as such had little power to negotiate better working conditions. At first sight, therefore, soldiers seem to be the antithesis of corporate expatriates and aid workers, but as we will show in the second part of this article, the two groups do share a number of important systemic (organizational) characteristics.
Aid Workers as Migrants 72
In the 1958 novel The Ugly American authors William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick describe a fictional campaign for people to apply for overseas duty: "'Now I know what's on your minds. At least on the minds of some of you,' Joe said jovially. 'Your social life. O.K., let's talk about it. You'll have to work among foreigners, but we don't expect you to love 'em just because you work among 'em. I don't care where you go to work for Uncle Sammy, you'll be living with a gang of clean-cut Americans. And a lot of 'em are single people, so you won't be lonesome if you're not married. '" 73 In the "factual epilogue" to their controversial book, Lederer and 72 Because this paragraph focuses on the second half of the twentieth century, most attention is being paid to aid workers. However, religiously motivated aid workers and religious NGOs are included, and the importance of contacts with the relatively small group of remaining missionaries is addressed (as predecessors in the field, they are often consulted for their historical and local knowledge Burdick take a critical stance toward the experiences of Americans in Southeast Asia in the context of Cold War politics. They suggest that, in contrast to the prevailing practice, Americans should be willing to risk their comfort and health, go equipped, speak the language of the country of their assignment, and be more expert in its problems than the natives. All in all they should be willing "to pay the human price." 74 As will become clear from our discussion of the historiography on (religiously motivated) aid workers, the latter characteristic is one of the main reasons why this group has not yet been studied as migrants. Just like soldiers, aid workers tend to be excluded from mainstream migration studies because of the supposed temporary nature of their move (assumption 1), their lack of agency with regard to their choice of destination (assumption 2), and the contrasting views with regard to the new social ties they forge (ranging from "going native" to isolating themselves in the "Aidland" bubble) (assumption 3). But more importantly, the fact that they do not so much join new communities but have other motives, be they altruistic or imperialist, for migration distinguishes them from "real migrants" (assumption 4). As Manning argues in his discussion of migration in world history, one possible motive for migration is "Samaritan": "the migrant may hope to contribute additional resources or benefits to the receiving community. This motivation is perhaps, most easily seen for religious missionaries, who move to new communities with the desire of spreading their faith, but can also be seen for people who move to spread new technologies." 75 In the case of present-day, non-religious aid workers, the term "humanitarian" seems to express a similar attitude. This motive for migration best suits the sojourner category in Manning's typology of cross-community migration, distinguishing them from settlers, itinerants, and invaders. He defines sojourners as "those moving to a new community, usually for a specific purpose [our italics] with the intention of returning to their home community." 76 In a widely cited 1977 article on expatriate communities, Erik Cohen distinguishes four types of "voluntary temporary migrants, mostly from affluent countries" on the basis of their purposes: business, mission, teaching, and leisure. Foreign aid personnel, representatives of foreign non-profit organizations, and missionaries are lumped together 74 Ibid., 240. 75 Manning, Migration in World History, 8. 76 Ibid., 9 (our italics).
in the category of "mission."
77 Although his distinction is somewhat arbitrary, because it also includes diplomatic and government representatives and military personnel stationed abroad, 78 while excluding "teaching" as a form of mission, it underlines the importance of organizations in shaping the experiences of such migrants.
The "voluntary" and "sacrificial" nature of aid workers' migration seems to be the major reason to exclude them from mainstream migration and labor studies. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, the fact that the fields of migration and labor history developed as part of the new social history in the 1960s and 1970s results in a focus on repressed groups with limited agency and who are dependent on market forces. Aid work does not fit this image, as it is often associated with volunteering. In a recent volume on the everyday lives of development workers, however, Fechter and Hindman make a plea to include aid within the anthropology of work. They emphasize the unclear boundary between career aid workers, student volunteers, retirees on working vacations, and religious groups engaged in outreach, whereas a "conflicted relationship [exists] between heeding the call to engage in forms of sacrifice and emotional labor as part of the caring aspect of aid and keeping their career desires and their own family's financial needs in mind." 79 Moreover, in his article "Mercenaries, Missionaries, and Misfits" on the existing stereotypes of aid workers, Roderick Stirrat criticizes the idea that "besides those motivated by money or by mission, there are also those who enter the world of development because they are misfits in their home country," and therefore are not taken seriously as employees. 80 In addition, development aid is often associated with skilled professionals who move from rich to poor countries and thus with aid workers who take a hegemonic position vis-à-vis subaltern groups (assumption 5). From the 1970s and 1980s onward, this has resulted in heated debates in the fields of anthropology and develop-77 E. Cohen, "Expatriate Communities," Current Sociology 24, no. 3 (1977): 6. 78 Note that many soldiers often also view their activities abroad as a form of help to (re)establish democracy, fight religions and ideologies that they perceive as wrong and dangerous, or protect people against aggression and natural disasters. That those to whom this "help" is directed may think otherwise does not make these motives less relevant or sincere to the organizational migrants themselves. 79 ment studies with regard to the moral and ideological dimensions of development. Especially from the 1960s onward, the political, economic, or religious agenda that determines foreign aid and donorhost relationships was labeled imperialist or neocolonialist. Recent developments in the professionalization and bureaucratization of the aid sector have increased the expert status of aid workers-their remuneration and lifestyles sometimes resembling those of corporate expatriates. Although this "normalization" has not brought them into the orbit of migration studies, more attention has focused recently on the social and cultural roles of aid workers, thus (implicitly) stressing their experience as migrants and workers. Mosse-an anthropologist with a previous career in development work-argues for a critical approach to the "world of Likewise, Fechter and Hindman plea for a broader perspective on the day-to-day experiences of aid workers: "Understanding the world of aid workers is central to generating a literature on development that goes beyond accusation and blame, although viewing their lives also produces new avenues for reexamining the processes of development. Rather than seeing human resources programs or cultural training of aid workers as marginal to the project of aid, we claim that they must be considered as central to aid." 82 While these authors may not conceptualize aid workers as migrants, they do refer to the global and mobile character of aid workers, and mention the role of human resources programs and cultural training in shaping the cross-cultural moves of these organizational migrants. This business surrounding the movement of aid workers and their families encompasses the entire migration period, starting before departure and ending with their lives after return. Similar to soldiers and corporate expatriates, there are also psychological studies dealing with "culture shock" among aid workers abroad, and resocialization problems (mainly with regard to Third Culture Kids, or TCKs) upon return. 83 In her work on American aid workers in Nepal, Hindman concludes that these private and domestic issues to some extent influence the development agenda and the power of the organizations involved: "Projects end not because their mission is achieved but because a family decides to allow their daughter to be educated in the United States." 84 As a result, the home is recreated abroad, "houses, schools, swimming pools, grocery stores were all built to sustain the life of the valuable scientists." 85 It is interesting that the careers of aid workers often display a generational path dependency, both forward (their children) and backward, as many have parents or family members who have been engaged as diplomats, colonial civil servants, or missionaries. The intergenerational reproduction of this type of work and migration is highlighted by David Lewis in his research among present-day British NGO workers, whose personal narratives reveal career histories shaped by experiences or family background. 86 In a similar fashion Fechter stresses the parallels in the roles taken by women in both the colonial enterprise and global capitalism today, despite not doing paid work (as "trailing spouses"). 87 
Mainstreaming Migration History and Aid Workers
In contrast to the gradual inclusion of soldiers, the above-mentioned specialist studies on (at times religiously motivated) aid workers are still left out from mainstream narratives and conceptualizations of migration and labor. To illustrate this we return to the four major reference works in the field of migration studies (Tables 4 and 5) . The 2011 encyclopedia edited by Klaus Bade et al. does not contain entries on missionaries or aid workers at all; this is explained, however, by the fact that it focuses on migration and minorities in Europe. In general, it becomes clear that when migration scholars focus on SouthNorth migrations, (religiously motivated) development aid is only discussed as part of the migration-development nexus, which means dealing with return migrants and remittances. Whenever attention is paid to North-South missionary activities and development aid, this is discussed in the context of (neo)colonialism. The movement of missionaries and aid workers as such is not considered as migration. In an entry on religious migration in the medieval era in the Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration, Tillmann Lohse suggests that because of the fluid boundaries between ascetics, pilgrims, and missionaries, they might perhaps better be characterized as travelers. 88 This categorization is especially characteristic of studies of Muslim migrations, where religiously motivated moves-often combining pilgrimage, teaching, and trade-cannot be traced back to a clear institutional center or state (or organization for that matter) and remain the topic of mobility and diaspora studies. 89 In a similar fashion, aid workers are often excluded from studies of international labor migration, as they are often volunteers (or aid workers employed on local contracts).
Hoerder's monograph only contains references to missionaries from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Asia and Africa. Although he mentions the cultural changes that were wrought by these religious practices, he pays little attention to missionaries as migrants. In line with the subaltern turn, he only briefly comments upon the negative attitudes of both Chinese authorities and the colonial powers in Latin America toward the opulent lifestyles of some foreign missionaries, as "[children] of the era of commercial capitalism." 90 The role of mission- aries in nineteenth-century Africa in supporting colonial regimes by teaching indigenous people the value of working for capitalist enterprises (plantations, farms, mines) and the opening of training institutions 91 does not help scholars to develop a more detached view and analyze missionaries' activities in terms of labor or migration. The entries on missionaries in the Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration are mainly concerned with the mission among international migrants and refugees. The entries by Fabio Baggio and Grazziano Battistella mention how missionaries from Italy, Spain, Poland, Germany, and Ireland were requested to work among the migrants who in large numbers moved to the Americas. But again, no attention is paid to their own experiences as migrants. There is only mention of the continuation of charitable work by some congregations, such as the Scalabrini missionaries, in other parts of the world today, and the "flexibility" and "courage" needed for the job.
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With regard to aid workers, the more contemporary focus of the Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration results in some attention being paid to the rise of intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Again, however, the emphasis is on their role in shaping migration, and much less as an institution forging migration and employing migrants. In an entry on health care professionals as migrant workers, Nicola Yeates does mention the involvement of the United Nations and various national voluntary services in sending people abroad. Moreover, she mentions the role of religious migration, with nursing nuns and religious orders from richer countries moving to poorer ones to fill the gap left by the emigration of nurses ("brain drain"). 93 Furthermore, in their entries on professional migrants and North-South migration, Colic-Peisker, Erima, and Edda Odok mention the role of foreign experts in executing projects funded through foreign aid and loans. 94 This migration often leads to developing countries sending their citizens to developed countries in order to be trained. As Kuptsch remarks, there is a significant (moral) difference in terminology between highly skilled workers who relocate from low-income 91 to high-income countries, labeled as brain drain (or brain gain), and highly skilled people moving from high-income to low-income countries being perceived as professionals in humanitarian aid. 95 Overall, we conclude that missionaries and aid workers, like soldiers, are often left out from mainstream migration (and labor) studies because of their dominant position vis-à-vis the residing population that they join or the migrants whom they are assumed to help. Or, to use Manning's terminology, because they are "invaders." Moreover, the temporary nature of their move-albeit not in duration of stay, but in the intention to return after completing the project/mission-only further deepens the rift between them and the "real" migrants. Although migration is seen as part of their profession-within the confines and interests of the organization for which they work, no attention is paid to the migratory behavior of individual missionaries or aid workers. This is particularly unfortunate, because both aid workers and missionaries are not only deeply involved in cross-cultural contacts, but due to their power and status, even small numbers can cause fundamental changes in religion, language, norms, and values.
Historiography and Qualitative Examples
Whereas we should be very grateful to military historians for our knowledge of soldiers as migrants and workers, in the case of aid workers and missionaries we owe a debt of gratitude to the fields of church history, missiology, colonial history, area studies, and anthropology for providing us with a wealth of data. As mentioned above, the attention paid to aid workers as migrants is rather new and-surprisingly-results from a growing awareness of the historical link between colonialism and development. Academic journals such as Third World Quarterly and Critique of Anthropology have started publishing articles that explicitly make a comparison between nineteenth-and early twentieth-century missionaries and colonial civil servants. These authors deal with what Roderick Stirrat calls "a modern version of what people in the industry tend to see as the new 'white man's burden. '" 96 It is important, though, to mention here the complex realities of the history of mission. Whereas at times the humanitarian activities went hand in hand with conquest and colonization, they were also part of a civilizing mission and an 95 See the entry of Kuptsch in Ness, The Encyclopedia of Global Human Migration. 96 Stirrat, "Mercenaries, Missionaries and Misfits," 407. ethnographic interest in the cultural "other." 97 As Peter Stamatov recently showed in the case of Catholic missionaries and later Quakers and Protestant reformists in Latin America, missionaries accused Spanish and Portuguese settlers of exploiting and abusing indigenous people in a "decidedly unchristian manner," and as a result, from the early modern period onward, even developed a pro-indigenist long-distance advocacy network that could be used in defense of the rights and interests of distant "others." The differences between Catholic and Protestant missions sometimes clearly reflected different political interests (and forms of imperialism) but also different ways of viewing potential converts. 98 But as Pels and Salemink state, "even those missionaries who had little or no tolerance toward 'other' customs had to communicate the Gospel, and to learn another language to do so." 99 With regard to Muslim missions, Ho argues that-at least for the Hadrami diaspora in the Indian Ocean from the sixteenth century onward-there existed no such link with trade and conquest, and contacts were on the basis of exchange. The practice of building schools and mosques and learning the local language, however, is no different. 100 The contradictions and tensions (religious) aid workers see themselves confronted with today have been addressed in biographies and autobiographies, such as Hancock's well- 110 Moreover, in her study of SNV Netherlands Development Organisation, Inge Brinkman notes the continuation of the colonial legacy in the contacts established by a new generation of volunteers with the white minority of settlers who stayed on in the former colonies: "The presence of Peace Corps volunteers, missionaries and white settlers was seen as reassuring for the young volunteers in faraway places. [. . .] as the possibilities for recreational activities were limited, any opportunity to go swimming, play tennis, go fishing or horse-riding was more than welcome. Such opportunities were more likely to occur in white circles than in African milieus." 111 Especially in the 1960s, these young, "alternative" volunteers did have "a strong wish to integrate into local society and were wary of being associated with colonialism."
112 They learned the local language, ate the local food, wore the local dress, and had local partners. Although this identification with the victims of Western dominance is inherent in development aid, the recent academic debate also relates to changes taking place in the field itself. The processes of professionalization and bureaucratization have effected a change in the people involved in development and the locales in which it takes place. As Stirrat writes, "in the past it was a matter of doing things: making things such as roads, bridges, reservoirs and dams, planting forests or creating irrigation systems." 113 Today, development is concerned with institutional reform and good governance and thus takes place in the capital cities: "Cocooned as they are in their expensive hotels and air conditioned vehicles, their contact with 'real people' is mediated through government officers, interpreters and go-betweens of various sorts."
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In her work on aid workers in Cambodia, Fechter describes the tensions this produces for those who want to be "close to the people" and "work at grassroots level." 115 Like others, she distinguishes between aid workers (noting that most volunteers live in homestays or at the fringes of the city) and NGO workers (who live in middle-class Cambodian neighborhoods) on the one hand, and donor staff (who live in villas in the central city) on the other. Stirrat observes a similar divide between the development professional (careerist motivations, material benefits) and the NGO worker (self-sacrifice). Moreover, there is the group of "development tourists," who-according to Jackson-find "working abroad most appealing" to aid work and want "to learn about other people, learn a new language." 116 These differences within the category of aid workers seem to reflect a varying degree of organizational logic and control. As Lisa Malkki describes in her article "A Tale of Two Affects" on doctors and nurses working in zones of crisis for the Finnish Red Cross: " [they] were not stereotypical humanitarians with a calling to help humanity, let alone to sacrifice themselves for its sake. They were not soldiers, either-and certainly not missionaries. They were internationalist professionals both in practice and in occupational disposition." 117 In his study of volunteers with the Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) in Indonesia, Philip Fountain notes that the emphasis on "bonding" and "belonging" to the new culture is especially strong among expatriate missionaries. In his analysis of orientation courses provided by the MCC, he describes the "drinking tea with the locals" myth. This implies that volunteers should try not to have a sense of superiority as "expert expats," but rather come as guests-and thus, again, another boundary is drawn. 118 The increasing professionalization of the aid sector has led to the hiring of more senior experts, offering higher salaries (conforming to the international labor market), and enabling them to bring along their partners and children. As Brinkman describes with regard to Dutch aid workers, this change in policy from the 1980s on resulted in fewer cross-cultural contacts, since "people with families were less likely to 'go native' and they built up their social networks according to their own preferences, at times within the ex-pat community." 119 Fechter questions whether this increased use of the same services provided for corporate expatriates poses any moral objections. The character of the expatriate community is often described in terms of a "ghetto" or "enclave," and comes with similar downsides, such as isolation and gossip, common in close-knit immigrant communities. Moreover, Rajak and Stirrat argue that aid workers' "failure at being cosmopolitan" and frustration about the loss of "youthful ideals of unmediated cross-cultural contact" actually result in nostalgia about home and empire. 120 As Timothy Mitchell describes in his book Rule of the Experts, 121 there exists a strong discrepancy between policy and practice, sometimes reinforcing global inequality rather than resolving it. This is also a major criticism voiced in studies on South-North migrations. As Rebecca Peters states in her article on Angolan and British health professionals, development has its own "mobility regime": "a global hierarchy that prevents some individual professionals, particularly those from developing nations, from realizing the same benefits of their cosmopolitan mobility as professionals from industrialized nations."
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Although these scholarly debates on aid workers' lifestyles may serve a different research agenda than that of migration historians, they provide insight into the role of class, ethnicity, age, motive, family history, community size, and duration of stay. Notwithstanding their high status, the experiences of aid workers are to a large extent similar to those of immigrants. For one, there is the ever-present relationship between migration and social mobility. American aid workers in Honduras, for example, through their salaries and benefits, end up in elite social circles, having access to top business executives, government ministers, and directors of international development agencies. As one of Jackson's interviewees stated: "Somebody told me that the dumbest thing I could do is go back to the United States, where I would be just another speck of dust like everybody else."
123 For many aid workers, the loss of social status upon return is actually a reason to move from country to country as posts become available, thus challenging the temporary nature of this type of organizational migration. Finally, aid workers, like other immigrants, experience feelings of loneliness and alienation, which are central to most psychological studies. As one American economist mentioned in his interview with Jackson: "You don't fit back home because no one really understands what you do. And you can never fully fit in with the country you're working in because you'll always be a foreigner. [. . .] But when you go home and everyone is talking about their cars or their lawn mowers or whatever, you think, 'God, this place is even crazier than I remember. I need to go back to Honduras. '" 124 As with soldiers, the nature of NGOs as organizations is most relevant to the experiences of aid workers abroad. The subsequent waves of "decolonization" (and for that matter secularization) and professionalization of development have changed the character of both aid workers and the locales in which they operate. There is now a broad spectrum of aid workers, divided on the bases of motivation, skill, and payment, ranging from volunteers to development professionals. Once employed, all aid workers have to follow the policy of their "headquarters" and tend to adhere to these "global agendas" in their private lives as well. 125 One way of undermining the control of the organization is by moving from post to post. However, this dependency on development work for maintaining one's lifestyle can become "a new form of prison."
126 Nevertheless, the case of aid workers shows that the definition of organizational migrants as those "whose migratory behaviour is primarily determined by the interests of the organization they have joined" works best for lower-status migrants and for mid-ranking businessmen. For higher-status officials and NGOs, there is more bargaining, more individual choice of destination, somewhat more control with regard to timing, length of stay, and so on. Their temporary, multiannual migrations can cross multiple geographic areas and even merge into the category of travel.
Conclusion
In this article we have tried to do two things: (1) explain why "organizational migrants" have been excluded from most mainstream (his-torical) studies on migration and labor, and (2) show that these mobile professionals have much more in common with other migrants and workers than is often assumed. In contrast to geographers, who are intrinsically interested in all kinds of spatial mobility, more recent academic specializations such as migration and labor history tend to be more exclusive.
As we have shown, the field of migration studies, especially its historical parcels, has largely resisted a broad and encompassing definition of human mobility. Most scholars implicitly or explicitly limit themselves to the more or less definite and "free" moves of the working class and forced migrations of refugees. The reason seems to be a curious mix of strange bedfellows. On the one hand, there is the dominance of (nation-)state definitions of what constitutes a migrant (people crossing international borders) and full members of that nation-state. On the other hand, the field is characterized by a highly ideological antistate current that aims to uncover the groups that have been marginalized and repressed by that very state. This combination of reproducing and fundamentally criticizing the gaze of the state has led to a de facto exclusion of people who are considered temporary movers and who are associated with the powerful, politically or economically-exemplified in this paper by soldiers and aid workers.
The availability of encompassing analytical tools and definitions, such as those offered by scholars like Wilbur Zelinsky, 127 Charles Tilly, 128 and Patrick Manning, 129 has created some cracks in the armor of migration studies, however, without causing a real breakthrough. Studies such as Nancy Green's work on American artists and business elites in Paris, Saskia Sassen's and Adrian Favell's focus on elite and non-elite migrants in global cities, 130 or Sanborn's focus on soldiers as migrants, for example, remain rather isolated from mainstream concerns and interests. This situation reflects a more general tendency in the field of social history (much more than economic history, in which business elites have received ample attention) 131 to study the working classes and more broadly those segments of the population that are deemed the victims of discrimination, exploitation, oppression, and exclusion. Organizational migrants are the perfect antithesis. These "repugnant others," at least in the eyes of many scholars, 132 were primarily considered as the agents of imperialism, capitalism, and militarism, and in that sense the progressive 1970s have left us a stubborn and self-limiting heritage. It seems no coincidence that in the subfields of both migration and labor history, Charles Tilly's analytical attempts to introduce broad definitions of migration 133 and (with Chris Tilly) work 134 have been only very partially accepted, if at all.
Our failure to free ourselves of these self-imposed conceptual limitations severely limits our understanding of why people move-or work-in the first place, as well as the effects their migration and working activities have on the people themselves, on those they join in the receiving society, and on the people they may return to. Our argument is not that class, power, or the type of migration do not matter-quite the contrary. Rather, for deeper insight into migration processes and labor relations, a broader perspective has many comparative benefits for world historians, and also for those who might remain interested in the classic topoi of migration studies. For that reason, a more systematic study of similarities and differences-with respect to the processes of working, moving, and settling-can enrich the fields of migration and labor history considerably. Organizational migrants are a particularly good example precisely because, due to their hegemonic position as (temporary) "invaders," they have the power to forge farreaching cultural, political, and social changes (for better or worse), often much more than migrants who settle in large numbers but who basically have to follow the rules and norms of the receiving society, albeit at the same time changing these as well, as the scholarship on migration and acculturation has amply showed. 135 These changes need not always support hegemonic and imperialist agendas and can have unintended effects, as shown in the examples of the humanitarian pro-indigenist activities of sixteenth-century Catholic orders in the 132 Much less so by receiving societies. 133 New World, and the reform of race-based immigration policies in the United States upon the return of GIs and their Asian "war brides" after World War II. 136 Due to its focus on class, labor history has made more progress to date by gradually including sailors and soldiers, although this integration is still somewhat piecemeal and sometimes occurs in a way that is too differentiated from how historians analyze other workers. As becomes clear in a recent formulation by Peter Way: "if the military is central to-and, in fact, productive of-those profound economic changes, it is necessary to conceptualise soldiers as war-workers, indeed as transnational labourers whose martial toil around the globe proved integral to the development of international capitalism." 137 Migration history has a long way to go, although geographers especially, as well as anthropologists, have largely paved the way. Their work is only waiting to be picked up by interdisciplinary migration scholars. In order to show how organizational migrants can be fitted in the fields of labor and migration history in a more systematic way, Figure 1 summarizes the full potential of the field along the axes of skills and institutional logic. The "skills" axis refers to the human capital of migrants and the skill premium they can derive from it. "Institutional logic," on the other hand, expresses the extent to which organizations can and do determine the migratory behavior of their employees. As the typology presented here is ahistorical, future research will have to make clear to what extent organizations and the people they turn into migrants show the same characteristics over time. In another context, similar questions have been posed both in migration and labor history, 138 especially where it regards the extent of (un)freedom, coercion, and agency, and the insights could very well be used to further historicize the role of organizational migrants (Fig. 2) . Whereas labor history by now has more or less covered the entire "Unterbau," with cautious expeditions up the skill ladder, most migration historians remain prisoner to their own state-and policy-imposed definitions and seldom venture outside the lower left box. With this paper we hope to have made clear that instead of risks and dangers, there are ample possibilities waiting out there. 
